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BACKGROUND: Interactions between physicians and
drug representatives are common, even though research
showsthatphysiciansunderstandtheconflictofinterest
between marketing and patient care. Little is known
about how physicians resolve this contradiction.
OBJECTIVE: To determine physicians’ techniques for
managing cognitive inconsistencies within their rela-
tionships with drug representatives.
DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: Six focus
groups were conducted with 32 academic and commu-
nity physicians in San Diego, Atlanta, and Chicago.
MEASUREMENTS: Qualitative analysis of focus group
transcripts to determine physicians’ attitudes towards
conflict of interest and detailing, their beliefs about the
quality of information conveyed and the impact on
prescribing, and their resolution of the conflict between
detailers’ desire to sell product and patient care.
RESULTS: Physicians understood the concept of con-
flict of interest and applied it to relationships with
detailers. However, they maintained favorable views of
physician–detailer exchanges. Holding these mutually
contradictory attitudes, physicians were in a position of
cognitive dissonance. To resolve the dissonance, they
used a variety of denials and rationalizations: They avoided
thinking about the conflict of interest, they disagreed that
industry relationships affected physician behavior, they
denied responsibility for the problem, they enumerated
techniquesforremainingimpartial,andtheyreasonedthat
meetings with detailers were educational and benefited
patients.
CONCLUSIONS: Although physicians understood the
concept of conflict of interest, relationships with detail-
ers set up psychological dynamics that influenced their
reasoning. Our findings suggest that voluntary guide-
lines, like those proposed by most major medical socie-
ties, are inadequate. It may be that only the prohibition
of physician–detailer interactions will be effective.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most pressing problems in American health care is
conflict of interest. Medicine is now a $2-trillion industry, and
conflicts frequently arise when physicians’“ interests or com-
mitments compromise their independent judgment or their
loyalty to patients.”
1 Financial-incentive structures in man-
aged care create potential conflicts between physicians’ desire
to maximize their income and the patients’ best interests.
2
Researchers funded by industry face “an implicit demand for a
positive finding to obtain further financial support.”
3
Among the most prevalent conflicts of interest are those
arising from physicians’ interactions with drug company sales
representatives, or “detailers.” Pharmaceutical companies em-
ploy about 90,000 detailers and spend over $7 billion annually
to market their products to physicians, averaging $15,000 per
year per physician.
4 Prescribing decisions can become conflicted
by free gifts, meals, travel, and other benefits. Because
physician–detailer interactions bias medical decision-making,
undermine public trust, and increase healthcare costs,
5–10 the
medical profession is now under unprecedented pressure to
“recognize, disclose to the general public, and deal with conflicts
of interest.”
11
We sought to investigate the extent to which individual
physicians “recognize, disclose, and deal with” conflicts of
interest in interactions with detailers. We used focus groups to
explore physicians’ beliefs about these interactions and their
techniques for managing the conflicts between marketing and
patient care. We then considered the implications of our
findings for policies to manage conflict of interest.
PHYSICIANS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS DRUG
REPRESENTATIVES
Although previous survey research has quantified physicians’
attitudes towards detailers, puzzling contradictions and in-
congruities remain. Surveys indicate that physicians generally
view interactions with detailers as educational and profession-
ally appropriate.
12,13 Yet, physicians also report that detailing
provides biased information and can compromise objectivi-
ty.
14–18 Most physicians contend that their colleagues are
susceptible to the industry’s influence but feel personally
invulnerable: In one study, 61% of residents felt that interac-
tions with pharmaceutical representatives did not alter their
own behavior, but only 16% felt that others were similarly
unaffected.
19 Another study found that 75% of attending
physicians believed that pharmaceutical marketing affects
residents’ prescribing, but only 49% of residents agreed.
18
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184Inconsistencies also pervade physicians’ attitudes towards
gifts from detailers. Most generally approve of gifts
19 and believe
accepting them is appropriate because they learn about new
products.
18 However, physicians do not want gift relationships
made public
20 and they acknowledge that gifts can compromise
objectivity.
16
These surveys identify a striking contrast between physi-
cians’ awareness of the negative effects of detailing and their
approval of the relationships. To analyze how physicians resolve
this contradiction and to explore the policy implications, we
conducted a series of focus groups. This methodology was
selected not to quantify the distribution of physicians’ attitudes
but to go beyond survey findings to an in-depth investigation of
physicians’ reasoning. Focus groups offered an excellent format
for exploring how physicians managed the inherent conflict
between the manufacturer’s desire to sell a product and their
own commitment to scientific integrity and patient care. We
hypothesized that physicians might use some of the same
psychological mechanisms identified by cognitive dissonance
theory. Our research supports that hypothesis. Our findings
also suggest that physicians have so many ways of justifying
their relationships with detailers that conflict-of-interest poli-
cies based on self-regulation are unlikely to succeed.
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
The concept of cognitive dissonance was originated by Leon
Festinger. After infiltrating a cult that believed that a flood
would destroy the earth on December 21, 1954, Festinger
analyzed the reactions when no flood occurred. He found that
the more dedicated members were to the cult, the more likely
they were to reinterpret the evidence to reaffirm their beliefs.
While fringe members tended to acknowledge their error and
abandon the cult, committed members insisted that their be-
liefs had been correct. Their faithfulness prevented the flood.
21
Building on these observations and later experiments,
Festinger posited that people prefer their beliefs to be consis-
tent with each other. When cognitions are dissonant—when
people “find themselves doing things that don’t fit with what
they know, or having opinions that do not fit with other opinions
they hold”
22—they experience discomfort and attempt to reduce
the dissonance. The greater the dissonance, the greater the
effort. While dissonance can occur when any 2 or more cogni-
tions conflict, it is strongest when it pertains to self-image.
22
Physicians face dissonance by interacting with detailers and
knowing that such encounters are intended to influence
prescribing. They recognize that these relationships may
compromise medical practice and that new regulations are
being promulgated to manage the problem. Because these
relationships potentially undermine physicians’ moral identity
as altruistic practitioners, physicians should be strongly
motivated to resolve the dissonance. Accordingly, our focus
groups first probed physicians’ awareness of conflicts of
interest in interactions with detailers and then explored the
means by which they managed the dissonance.
METHODS
In June 2004, using standard techniques,
23 a trained moder-
ator led 6 60-minute sessions, following detailed discussion
guides composed by the authors (available online at http://
www.imapny.org). A market research firm recruited the sub-
jects from a database of individuals that had previously
expressed interest in participating in focus groups. The
purpose identified in the recruitment invitation was to discuss
“interactions between physicians and the pharmaceutical
industry.” Excluded were physicians who had a direct rela-
tionship with employees in the media or health industries. All
sessions were audiotaped.
To capture possible variations by geographic region and
medical specialty, separate groups were held with primary care
physicians and specialists in San Diego, Atlanta, and Chicago.
The groups had an average of 5 participants (the range was 4
to 7). Group size reflected the principle that “small groups
work best when the participants are likely to be interested in
the topic...and when the researcher desires a strong sense of
each participant’s reaction.”
23 Institutional review boards at
Columbia University’s Medical Center and at Harvard Uni-
versity’s School of Public Health approved the study, and
participants gave written informed consent.
Thirty-two academic and community physicians participat-
ed—18 primary care and 14 specialists. Specialties included
were thoracic surgery, hematology, oncology, cardiology, infec-
tious disease, urology, orthopedics, gastroenterology, pulmo-
nology, and geriatric medicine. A majority (59%) were in private
practice, and more than two-thirds (69%) had practiced over
10 years. Eighty-four percent were male (Table 1).
The focus groups opened by discussing the term “conflict of
interest.” Participants were asked to define the term and to
discuss whether it concerned them, their colleagues, or their
patients. Participants were also asked to share any personal
experiences with conflicts. The moderator then introduced a
hypothetical situation:
It is common for representatives from drug companies to
spend time talking to doctors to promote their com-
pany’s products.Atthesemeetings,thedoctormayreceive
a gift from the representative—something modest like a
pen or a notepad, or something more substantial, ike the
salesperson might buy the doctor a meal ata fancy restau-
rant, tickets to a sporting event, or a trip to a ski resort.
The moderator asked if participants had any positive or
negative feelings about the situation, if they had personally
experienced it, and if it constituted a conflict of interest. The
moderator asked whether the gift’s value was relevant. To
further gauge attitudes, the moderator asked for reactions to a
study demonstrating that relationships with industry influ-
enced physician behavior.









No. (%) male 16 (89) 11 (79) 27 (84)
No. (%) in practice
1–10 years 5 (28) 5 (36) 10 (31)
11–20 years 8 (44) 6 (43) 14 (44)
20+ years 5 (28) 3 (21) 8 (25)
No. (%) in private
practice
11 (61) 8 (57) 19 (59)
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investigator (SC) and a research assistant reviewed the
transcribed audiotapes to identify major themes. Transcripts
were manually coded for the presence of each theme (under-
standing of conflict of interest, attitudes towards drug
representatives, and responses to research findings). Differ-
ences of opinion in the coding process were discussed and
resolved. Because focus group methods are appropriate for
assessing similarities but not differences among participants,
only themes that appeared in all 6 focus groups were
analyzed.
RESULTS
Acknowledging Conflicts of Interest
The contradiction between participants’ approval of detailing
and their awareness of the inherent conflict of interest emerged
clearly. Working definitions of the concept of conflict of interest
came easily:
In the medical context, obviously you’re the fiduciary
for the patient, and if you’re doing something for your
economic interest, it’s not in the best interest of the
patient. That’s a conflict of interest if you act on that.
Conflict of interest is something supplanting what’s best
for the patient with external factors. They can be
monetary, prejudice, personal, whatever it is, but some
external factor that delays or changes what you do that’s
not best for the patient.
Participants took their examples, spontaneously and re-
peatedly, from managed care (prepayment or capitated health
plans) and described these conflicts in personal terms. They
expressed concern about how they and the profession were
inescapably caught up in these conflicts:
We’re all conflicted. Prior to managed care...we profited
from ordering what we did. The more we ordered, the
more we billed, and it was a fee per service pay scale.
We profited from that structure...With capitation and
managed care the opposite occurred. The less you did
the more you did in take-off. In our industry, it’s
inherent.
Physicians readily acknowledged that the problem was
relevant to pharmaceutical representatives:
They’re dropping off pens and pads [because] drug reps
want sales.
These things can be a form of kickback.
Welcoming Interactions with Detailers
Recognizing conflict of interest did not inhibit physicians’
interactions with detailers. They welcomed the interactions,
describing detailers as pleasant, friendly, and helpful, not as
calculating salespersons: “It’s nice to have a nice relation-
ship” and “It’s nice to see the people constantly.” Participants
also explained that they liked receiving gifts and regretted
that gifts had become more “modest”
24:
I’ll be honest, I miss getting the [sporting event] tickets.
It’s just basically educational materials now. I heard of
some golf outings...but it’s predominantly educational
materials. I think they’ve kind of cracked down and got
more stringent policies...The golden era is gone for
physicians [laughter].
Regulatory efforts irritated the physicians. They resented
limitations on entertainment and other personal-use gifts
recommended by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufac-
turers of America (PhRMA) (the industry trade association)
and endorsed by the Office of the Inspector General of Health
and Human Services
25,26:
The rules are very strict now.
We’re still getting dinners and pens and pencils and stuff
like that. Much less than it used it be...I think the
PhRMA Code is still a little too strict.
They particularly objected to excluding spouses from
industry-sponsored events:
We’re not allowed to bring our significant others to
dinners...I think it’s ridiculous, insulting...not to be able
to spend an extra hour or two with our wives while we’re
getting an education.
These restrictions, they insisted, were unfair and unneces-
sary. One physician referred to the PhRMA Code as “the
Doofus Code.”
MANAGING COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
Cognitive dissonance theory is a useful frame for understand-
ing the contradictory nature of physician reasoning. It specifies
3 methods, not mutually exclusive, by which people manage or
reduce dissonance
22: (1) eliminating the dissonance, by alter-
ing 1 or more of the conflicting attitudes or behaviors; (2)
rationalization, by using additional information to reduce
dissonance between the conflicting cognitions; and (3) denial,
by forgetting or rejecting the significance of 1 or more of the
conflicting elements.
The first option is often difficult or painful: It requires giving
up a pleasurable behavior or a closely held belief and provokes
feelings of foolishness, regret, or immorality. The other 2
options often work well: Most people “are clever enough to
come up with ad hoc hypotheses or rationalizations to save
cherished notions,” or they simply deny the existence of the
contradiction.
27
The option of eliminating the dissonance would require
physicians not to interact with detailers. No participant in our
focus groups reported shunning detailers; rather, they provided
a variety of rationalizations and denials, often contradictory.
Participants, however, did not comment on the logical incon-
sistencies.
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Participants declared that they “rarely think about” conflict of
interest, although they might occasionally discuss it with close
colleagues:
It’s not something you generally wind up talking about.
I don’t think it’s a big discussion [topic] with people,
without really knowing who they’re talking to. If you’re
either saying the wrong thing or getting people to think
that they do things that they shouldn’t do.
They also reported devoting little time to considering how
best to resolve conflicts.
Avoiding Responsibility
Physicians denied responsibility for conflicts of interest, de-
scribing the root causes as external, whether they involved
managed care or pharmaceutical companies:
There’s always a conflict of interest, every time you
decide to do a test there’s a conflict of interest...Every
time you do it you’re going to get a benefit from it.
There’s a conflict of interest in the procedure.
I own stock in major pharmaceutical companies. And I
prescribe their products. So is that a conflict of inter-
est?...You cannot escape writing Pfizer medications.
Today everything is owned by Pfizer. But it’s my way of
telling you that it [happens] at all levels.
Similarly, participants addressed conflicts involving drug
representatives in impersonal terms. The pronouns “we” and
“I,” which often appeared in their discussions of managed care
conflicts, were replaced by “they” and “them”:
It’s obviously an issue in medicine where, for example, a
physician’s relationship with a drug company may
influence them to use those drugs.
The acceptance [of gifts] is a relative conflict of interest
from the standpoint that it costs the pharmaceutical
companies money to provide whatever it is they are
providing, and that is added to the cost of the medica-
tion for the patient.
Emphasizing Benefits
Physicians emphasized the educational aspects of relation-
ships with detailers. They repeatedly stated that their overrid-
ing purpose was to exchange medical information:
I don’t think it’s a conflict of interest. It’s a way of getting
you to learn about a product.
Theyjusttellyou abouttheir productand youlearnaboutit.
A lot of the things I know about the new drugs, I learned
from the pharmaceutical representatives.
Physicians also explained that detailers provided drug
samples. Although they admitted that samples affected pre-
scribing, they emphasized the benefits to patients:
Sometimes you tend to return a favor when you get a lot
of samples, thinking of patients who are self-pays. You
tend to write a little more so they will come back and give
you more samples
I’m more influenced by having enough medication to give
my patients some so they can try and see what within
that class of medication is effective.
Physicians added that samples strengthened relationships
with patients, insured or not.
Dismissing Harms
Physicians denied being influenced by pharmaceutical repre-
sentatives:
I just prescribe the medication that is best for the
patient.
You practice medicine in an ethical fashion...You accept-
ed the perks that were offered, but personally it never
made any difference in what I have or have not
prescribed.
We get the lunches, the house staff may enjoy it, but I
haven’t seen it influence.
Physicians went on to identify strategies for remaining
impartial. Most often, they described taking information from
representatives “with a grain of salt”:
I take a lot of it with a grain of salt. It presents informa-
tion but it’s always going to be in their best interest.
They try for education with a spin.
Ninety percent of what they’re telling you is propaganda.
I don’t mind hearing their spin, I just take it with the
appropriate grain of salt.
The “grain of salt” argument would seem to contradict the
claim that exchanges with detailers were educational, but
physicians often expressed these 2 contradictory positions
simultaneously. Despite “spin” and “propaganda,” physicians
welcomed “educational” information from representatives
and were confident of their ability to evaluate detailers’
claims.
Some physicians insisted that receiving information from
competing companies protected them against bias:
One class of drugs has five products, [so] five reps are
coming in to talk to you. It is not like one rep is coming
and that is [all you hear]...So, the five people come. We
listen to the five people about their products, and we
think about the pros and what is best for the patients.
Some physicians acknowledged that relationships with
detailers influenced their prescribing:
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you [dispensed] it, you start a patient on the samples.
The drug companies give them out for a reason...they
want you to become accustomed to the medication. They
want it embedded in your mind.
However, they insisted that such behavior had no negative
impact on patient care because influence occurred only when
products were equal:
Why not [prescribe the representative’s drug], because
these are two equal drugs, and you are coming and
being nice and being helpful to the staff and whatever...
I’m not hurting my patient. I’m using your drug
because you are nicer. What is wrong with that? I don’t
think there is any conflict of interest.
[Take] two very similar medications both on the formu-
lary. If I have a very nice rep, and I, you know—one time I
was invited to a nice restaurant I can’t afford on my own.
I probably will prescribe [that company’s drug], but
that’s so minor. I mean, what I tend to do is prescribe
all across the board.
Physician Responses to Research Findings
The moderator presented physicians with results from a well-
known study
5:
Meetings with pharmaceutical representatives were
associated with requests by physicians for adding the
drugs to the hospital formulary and changes in
prescribing practice. Drug company-sponsored con-
tinuing medical education (CME) preferentially high-
lighted the sponsor’s drug(s) compared with other
CME programs. Attending sponsored CME events
and accepting funding for travel or lodging for educa-
tional symposia were associated with increased pre-
scription rates of the sponsor’s medication. Attending
presentations given by pharmaceutical representative
speakers was also associated with nonrational pre-
scribing.
A few physicians accepted the findings at face value,
recounting how other physicians were influenced:
I’m [on] the formulary [committee] at my hospital, and
every time we meet, we have requests for new drugs.
And we know that the drug reps go to the doctor with a
letter, and all the doc has to do is sign the letter and
send it to the formulary committee. And they do it all
the time.
That’sw h e r et h ec o n f l i c tc o m e si n .[ T h ed r u g s ]a r ea l l
the same. There are doctors that, if they’re wined and
dined, they’re going to prescribe that out of loyalty.
Most participants, however, disputed the study. Some
superficially accepted the findings but provided their own,
positive interpretations of the data. Physicians, for example,
were applying new knowledge they had gained:
Why should it be a conflict of interest just because
physicians attended a meeting and remember a product
and use it?
If I go and teach him about [a drug], and he uses [it], is
that necessarily a bad thing? Or if I learn because I went
to his lecture...for God’s sake is it bad that I now
prescribe?
Others argued that prescribing a new drug recommended by
a representative served a scientific or therapeutic process, as if
physicians were skillfully testing the efficacy of new products:
In my opinion, you’ve got to see how the drug works.
That’s not a conflict of interest.
You see an ad on TV for a new, similar product. Would
you try it and see if it’s better than the one you use? So
there’s going to be more sales, but if it’s not as good, or if
it’s worse, the sales will [fall].
Physicians again reasoned that no harm occurred because
the drugs prescribed were safe and effective:
Just because you attend a meeting that’s sponsored by a
pharmaceutical company doesn’t mean that that drug is
really not good and effective.
It’s not necessarily bad if you go to a Lipitor CME and
prescribe a little more Lipitor at the expense of Zocor or
[another competitor]. That’s not bad. Yes, it is influenced
prescribing, but it’s not bad...[The drugs are] all good.
In essence, they overlooked the conflict and cited the general
efficacy of approved pharmaceuticals.
Some physicians insisted that no conflict existed so long as
the physician did not knowingly harm the patient:
The conflict of interest would be if I used the drug and I
knew it didn’t work, and I still continued to try it.
[The problem would be] something that influences
prescribing to a disadvantage to the patient, and you
know it’s a disadvantage to the patient...You know it,
and you do it anyway.
In sum, physicians offered alternative analyses that mini-
mized the study’s implications. No one discussed relative cost
or efficacy.
DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGING
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Cognitive inconsistencies permeated the focus group discus-
sions. Although physicians recognized the inherent conflicts of
interest, they defended their interactions with drug represen-
tatives. Physicians invoked a variety of mechanisms to resolve
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problem and their part in it; they justified the interactions as
not only harmless but also beneficial; and, when confronted
with evidence to the contrary, they reinterpreted the data to
maintain their beliefs.
Most medical organizations, including the American Medical
Association
24 and the American College of Physicians,
28 have
endorsed voluntary guidelines similar to the PhRMA Code, but
they prohibit only the most egregious practices, such as gifts
with explicit “strings attached,” and make no provisions for
monitoring or enforcement.
29 Given physicians’ attitudes, even
these minimal standards are not likely to succeed, nor is for-
mal physicianeducationlikelytosuffice.
30Communicatingdata,
whether through medical newsletters or “counter-detailing,” is
important but insufficient to offset prevailing attitudes and
practices. One longitudinal study recently reported that, despite
aneducationalintervention, residents’ attitudes toward detailers
became more positive with continued interaction.
31
Given physicians’ techniques for managing dissonance, it
appears that only the prohibition of physician–detailer inter-
actions will be effective.
29 This position is now gaining popu-
larity. Some HMOs (including Kaiser Permanente) and a
growing number of medical centers are restricting detailers’
access to staff and are devising strategies to control conflicts of
interest.
29,32
Government regulation is also increasing. The Office of the
Inspector General at the Department of Health and Human
Services endorsed the PhRMA Code in 2003 and, going further,
now requires companies to separate medical education grant-
making from their sales and marketing departments.
26 At the
state level, California compels companies to declare an annual
dollar limit on gifts to individual providers.
33 Vermont, Maine,
Minnesota, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia require
pharmaceutical companies to report gifts and payments to
healthcare providers.
34,35 Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, and Washington are considering similar bills, and Mary-
land and Connecticut are contemplating banning all gifts.
36
Our study has several limitations. Thirty-two physicians in
3 geographic areas participated, which may limit the general-
izability of our analysis. Qualitative methods do not allow for
determining the proportion of physicians who held any given
attitude. Nonetheless, the themes reported recurred in all focus
groups, enhancing the likelihood that they accurately reflect
physicians’ general attitudes. Participants may also have down-
played and underreported their interactions with drug repre-
sentatives—but such a bias would give our findings added
strength.
In the end, it would be preferable were individual physi-
cians, mindful of the principles of medical professionalism, to
reduce or eliminate interactions with drug representatives.
Our findings, however, suggest that physicians’ techniques for
managing cognitive dissonance render this prospect unlikely.
Because physicians are not prone to policing themselves, the
growing likelihood is that they will be policed by others.
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